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Baby Boomers – those who are currently between 50 and 70 years old – are often blamed by
younger generations for many issues, from those associated with pensions and healthcare, to
the unaffordability of housing, and even the vote to leave the EU. Jennie Bristow outlines the
discourse and explains its implications.
Amidst the raw outrage that followed the EU referendum vote on 23 June 2016, one generation
found itself to be a particular target. ‘Baby boomers, you have already robbed your children of
their future. Don’t make it worse by voting for Brexit,’ appealed James Moore in the Independent
the day before the vote. ‘“This vote doesn’t represent the younger generation who will have to live with the
consequences”: Millennials vent fury at baby boomers for voting Britain OUT of the EU’, reported Alex Matthews for
the Mail two days later. As the recriminations flew, an image took hold: hordes of wealthy, powerful Baby Boomers,
engaged in a generational conspiracy to do everything possible to rob the young of their rightful future.
‘This is not the first time our generation has suffered this kind of treatment,’ complained Philip Bronk from London on
the Independent’s letters page. He echoed the now well-established cultural script of Boomer-blaming:
‘The baby boomers subsidised their lives with massive public borrowing, then voted for austerity; they
enjoyed final salary pension schemes, then abolished them; they enjoyed free university education,
then voted to abolish that too; they enjoyed public utilities, then sold them off; and now, after enjoying
a lifetime of EU citizenship, they’ve voted to take it away from us – not even to save money, but
simply to give them a nationalistic thrill. Enough is enough!’
Such generational bitterness evades some of the more nuanced features of the Brexit vote: such as the split within
generations. Older people were more likely to have voted ‘Leave’ than younger people, but polls suggest that just
under two-fifths of Baby Boomers (generally – albeit contentiously – defined as those born between 1945 and 1965,
now aged between about 50 and 70) voted to remain in the EU.
As for why the Boomers, as a generation, should be associated with a vote to Leave, the media narrative offers little
specific explanation. A destructive selfishness is presumed – although, as Judith Woods suggests in the Telegraph,
many Brexit-voting Boomers were ‘genuinely convinced they were doing what was best for Britain, regardless of the
fallout’. Knee-jerk post-Brexit Boomer blaming seems to rely most heavily on a generalised, and increasingly
consolidated, sentiment that the political, cultural, and economic difficulties that we face today are the fault of people
born in the two decades after the Second World War.
The narrative of Boomer-blaming is the subject of a recent article, which sought to understand the evolution of
claims that the Boomer generation are responsible for myriad social problems – from overpriced housing to the
global economic crisis to the difficulties afflicting pensions and healthcare provision. I conducted a media analysis of
articles published in a sample of national British newspapers from 1986 to 2011, to understand how the discussion
of the Boomer generation has changed over this time. I found that, while the Boomers have been of some interest to
British newspapers for a number of years, it is only in recent years that this generation has been constructed
predominantly as a problem; and that it has been constructed as a problem in two main ways.
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First, the Boomers are constructed as an economic problem. As a relatively large generation, they stand accused of
using a disproportionate share of society’s resources. This coincides with a wider anxiety about the effects of an
ageing population, and the problems afflicting the welfare state. Thus, the trope of ‘Boomergeddon’ is used in 2006,
in articles speculating about the impact of the Boomers’ impending retirement, and reflects and reinforces a negative
image of ‘ageing’.
Particularly since the global financial crisis of 2007-8, Boomer-blaming has also focused on their historical location:
children of the ‘post-war Boom’ whose coming-of-age is associated with the 1960s. Not only are they draining the
pension pot, it is claimed: they have used up everything. Back in 2008, the journalist Sarah Vine wrote in the Times
that members of this  ‘extraordinary generation’ were not only ‘economically blessed’:
‘they also had some of the most hedonistic and uncomplicated fun since the Romans: all the sex (by
the time that we came of age, HIV had put a stop to all that), the best music (I’m sorry, Coldplay is no
match for Jimi Hendrix), all the easy idealism of privilege.’
A heavily-moralised narrative constructs the Boomer generation as a cultural problem, via their association with the
Sixties, and in turn blames this generation for political mismanagement, economic crisis, and a selfish, hedonistic
approach to life. The trope of ‘Boomergeddon’ comes to symbolise the problem of a generation that, allegedly, has
dominated society by its size and outlook, and wreaked havoc for those born later.
As I outline in my article, Boomer-blaming incorporates a number of troubling simplifications and assertions. The
assumption that the Boomer generation as a whole shared a particular experience associated with some of its
members (university education, final salary pension schemes, ‘all the sex’), and that the Sixties generation
somehow missed the Seventies, refuses to recognise inequalities, differential experiences, and historical shifts, and
imposes a uniformity of opinion on a heterogeneous group.
The elision of ‘Baby Boomers’ with ‘old people’ presents the elderly as a burden to society – even when they are still
actively middle-aged. This, too, should give us pause. In the making of “Boomergeddon”, we can see how
apocalyptic warnings about a demographic pensions time-bomb lead to a discussion about the problem of longevity,
with its implication that economic problems would be ameliorated if only unproductive older people would shuffle of
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this mortal coil with greater haste. The narrative of post-Brexit Boomer blaming, meanwhile, has been replete with
cries of ‘generational betrayal’, underpinned by the claim that the older generation ‘will not be around to see the
damage wreaked’ by the decision to leave the EU. According to such logic, disenfranchisement is too good for them.
Boomer-blaming often wraps itself in the clothes of ‘inter-generational justice’. I suggest that its effect is rather to
foment division, and encourage a fatalistic sense of resentment and powerlessness among young people.
____
Note: the above is based on the author’s article, published in The British Journal of Sociology .
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